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Abstract
In a dramatic move to confront the prolonged and often violent student protests on col-
lege campuses, the Japanese government ordered that every student repeat the school
year at the University of Tokyo in 1969. The move had the inadvertent eﬀect of deny-
ing those graduating from high school in that year an opportunity to seek admission
to the nation’s foremost institution of higher education. This paper uses the highly
unusual event as a natural experiment, and examines whether graduates from the elite
Tokyo university receive a preferential treatment in hiring and promotion in the high
civil service. As a result of the 1969 incident, the entering class in the high civil service
four years later in 1973 included a signiﬁcantly lower proportion of graduates from the
University of Tokyo, the traditionally predominant provider of elite bureaucrats, than
in usual years. Comparing the career paths of the entering class of 1973 with those of
adjacent cohorts, we do ﬁnd some evidence that where one went to school may matter
in the hiring stage, but no signiﬁcant evidence for a similar favoritism in promotion in
later stages.
†JEL classiﬁcation codes: I21, J4, J45.
‡Key words: human capital, college education, elite college, public sector labor market,
promotion.
∗The author feels indebted to Prof. Okita Yoichi and Prof. Kawaguchi Daiji for helpful comments and
encouragement. Financial support from the KDI School of Public Policy and Management and the National
Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Japan, is gratefully acknowledged. Yamamoto Fumiko and
Jiyoung Lee provided diligent research assistance. Correspondences should be directed to Taejong Kim,
KDI School, P.O.Box 184 Cheong-nyang, Seoul 130-650, Korea. The author may also be contacted at
tjkim@kdischool.ac.kr via email, or at +81-(0)2-3299-1085 by phone. Preliminary draft.
1Premium for Elite College Education 1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a dramatic move to confront the prolonged, and often violent, student protests on college
campuses around the country, the Japanese government ordered in January 1969 that every
student at the prestigious University of Tokyo repeat the previous academic year, citing the
students’ failure to meet the minimum class requirement. The move had the inadvertent
eﬀect of denying the high school-graduating class of 1969 an opportunity to seek admission
to the nation’s foremost institution of higher education.
This paper uses this unusual event as a natural experiment to examine whether there is
a premium for elite college education for those serving in the government. Four years later,
in 1973, the entering class in the high civil service included a signiﬁcantly lower proportion
of graduates from the university. We analyze whether the 1973 cohort experienced discrimi-
nation in the hiring and promotion decisions in the government service in comparison to the
adjacent cohorts, due to a lower representation of the University of Tokyo graduates in their
midst.
The focus on government oﬃcials is motivated by two considerations. First, the gov-
ernment sector is well known for the traditionally high concentration of graduates from the
Tokyo university, and is arguably most signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the 1969 admission freeze
at the university. Second, if there is favoritism based on where one went to college, it is
more likely to show up in the government than in the private sector, the latter being directly
exposed to market discipline. The second consideration suggests that whatever impact we
may ﬁnd in the government is likely to provide something akin to an upper bound for similar
eﬀects elsewhere in the economy.1
Whether there is an extra return to elite college education has been receiving a growing
attention. In the U.S., the tuition inﬂation and the increasing skills premium may help
account for the rising interest in the question among both academics and the public at large.
In many parts of the developing world, there is a widely shared concern about cronyism,
which may be fed partly through formal and informal ties forged among the lucky few
1In a planned joint work with Abe Naohito, I intend to explore the eﬀects of the University of Tokyo
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during their time together in elite colleges.
Despite several ingenious attempts to be reviewed shortly, answering the question remains
ad i ﬃcult empirical task, essentially because it is diﬃcult to estimate the counterfactual
outcome: what would have happened to these bright and ambitious graduates from elite
colleges, had they attended a diﬀerent, lower-ranking, college? The 1969 admission freeze at
the University of Tokyo is valuable as a natural experiment, as it provides the missing piece
in the puzzle, albeit in the limited institutional context of the government sector in Japan.
We report evidence that the value of the University of Tokyo degree may vary at diﬀerent
stages in the careers of oﬃcials. In the hiring stage, government ministries increased both
the number of recruits and the proportion of the University of Tokyo graduates among
them in the four hiring seasons of 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972, presumably in anticipation
of the coming crunch in 1973, while reducing the number of fresh recruits in 1973 itself.
Yet, regression results, using the 1973 entry into the government service as an instrument,
suggest that the University of Tokyo degree had little impact on the promotion probabilities
i nt h ea d v a n c e ds t a g e s . T h ee v i d e n c ei sc o n s i stent with the view that degrees from elite
colleges may serve as a valuable signal in the early stages of labor market experience, when
e m p l o y e r sh a v ep r e c i o u sl i t t l ed a t ao nj o ba s p i r a n t s ,w h i l et h es i g n a lm a yl o s ei t sv a l u ei n
t h el a t e rs t a g e s ,o n c ee m p l o y e r sh a v eh a de n o u g ht i m et oo b s e r v et h et r u ep r o d u c t i v i t yo f
their workers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 will brieﬂy review the relevant
literature. Section 3 introduces the data to be analyzed. Section 4 will present the main
results, to be followed by concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
The literature most closely related to the current paper is a small but growing number of
papers measuring the impact of college quality on subsequent earnings in the labor market.
Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1996) and Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg (1999) both
provide an excellent survey of the literature.
As Ben-Porath (1967) formalized, production of human capital involves three main in-Premium for Elite College Education 3
puts: (a) human capital endowed to individuals, including inherent ability and family en-
dowments, (b) time spent for investment in human capital, and (c) other purchased inputs.
That these three types of inputs are likely to be correlated with each other presents a tough
empirical challenge to an investigator trying to estimate a causal impact of any of the factors
on subsequent labor market outcomes.
For instance, consistent estimation of returns to schooling requires in principle that the
right hand side of the regression equation have all the variables listed above. To circum-
vent the considerable data requirement, some researchers have relied on twins studies or
instrumental variables empirical strategies based on institutional changes in the education
system. The returns-to-schooling literature is a ﬁne example whereby complementary em-
pirical strategies have successfully contributed to a deeper understanding of the empirical
relationships under investigation, as superbly surveyed by Card (1999).
Estimation of the impact of school (or college) quality on subsequent earnings presents
a similar hurdle in data requirement. Earlier empirical studies, while striving to control
for observables, usually failed to measure all of the inputs in the human capital production
function. For instance, Solmon (1973), Wachtel (1976), and Altonji (1988), among others,
used test scores to control for ability along with school quality measures. The test scores,
however, may not only measure endowments incompletely and imperfectly, but may also
reﬂect the inﬂuence of school inputs in earlier stages, as noted by Behrman, Rosenzweig,
and Taubman (1996). It is worth emphasizing that representing school quality by inputs
at a given school level is not suﬃcient. To measure the impact of quality of college one
attended, for instance, we should include quality indicators not just for college, but for all
school levels to which one has been exposed. To the extent that these (unobserved) variables
as well as family endowments are positively correlated with input indicators at the college
level, OLS estimates are likely to overstate the true impact of college quality on earnings.
Ono (forthcoming in Industrial Relations) studies the relationship between college qual-
ity and earnings in the Japanese labor market. The study controls for individual ability,
using the respondent’s self-reported grade point average in ninth grade. As pointed out by
Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1996), however, failure to control for family back-
grounds and for input quality at diﬀerent levels of schooling may still be biasing the OLSPremium for Elite College Education 4
estimates.
Several recent studies adopted careful and ingenious empirical strategies to adjust for
selection on unobserved variables. Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg (1999) explicitly model
high school students’ choice of college type based on individual and family characteristics,
and estimate selectivity-corrected outcome equations. Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman
(1996) diﬀerence out unobserved individual and family characteristics using twins data. Dale
and Krueger (2002) compare college quality and earnings among students who were accepted
and rejected by a comparable set of colleges, and are comparable in terms of observable
variables.
The current paper complements the studies above in three ways. First, to our best
knowledge, the paper is the ﬁrst to take advantage of a natural experiment that allows us
to examine what would have happened to those who attended an elite college, had they
attended a less selective college. Second, we study the impact of elite college education on
hiring and promotion, instead of earnings. In the context of long-term employment practices
in Japan, promotion within the organization is closely accompanied by increased earnings.
Third, examining the separate impacts of elite college education on hiring at the entry level
and on promotion in later stages is likely to yield informative results bearing on the diﬀerent
roles played by elite education as a signal in diﬀerent stages of one’s life cycle.
3 Data and Institutional Backgrounds
The data come from two sources: seikan y¯ oran and Hata (2003). seikan y¯ oran is a directory of
politicians and high-ranking government oﬃcials serving in the Diet, the nation’s parliament,
and the central government ministries. The biannual publication covers government oﬃcials
above the rank of assistant section chief, and provides information on the current rank
and post, the year of entry into the government service, and basic biographic data such as
birthday, birthplace, the name of college one graduated from, and the college major. Hata
(2003) lists the names of individuals who entered the government service after passing the
highly competitive Civil Service Exam, Class I, by ministry and entry year as well as the
name of college they attended before joining the ministry.Premium for Elite College Education 5
We use the data from Hata (2003) for two purposes. First, we trace the changes in
the number of fresh recruits and the proportion of graduates from the University of Tokyo,
Faculty of Law (UTL, hereafter), around 1973. This allows us to examine whether and
how the ministries adjusted their hiring policy, anticipating the consequences of the 1969
admission freeze at the University of Tokyo. We also use the information to identify those
who entered the civil service through the Civil Service Exam, Class I, among those listed in
various issues of seikan y¯ oran.
The civil service in Japan recruits new entrants through a system of examinations that
are stratiﬁed both hierarchically and functionally. Hierarchically, there are two classes of
exams, Class I and Class II. Class I is the more selective entrance gate for elite bureaucrats.
The system promotes Class II entrants at a slower pace, and places a promotion ceiling for
them at the middle management level. Functional division in the exams breaks down into
administration, law, economics, psychology, and miscellaneous ﬁelds in engineering, agricul-
ture, and forestry. Of them, the ﬁrst three ﬁelds of administration, law, and economics,
collectively called h¯ obunkei, constitute the backbone of the central government’s elite bu-
reaucracy. Despite their relatively small number,2, h¯ obunkei oﬃcials traditionally dominate
in the key posts in the chain of command and the critical posts for external liaison. In the
remainder of the paper, we focus on Class I h¯ obunkei oﬃcials, and analyze the patterns of
hiring and promotion with emphasis on UTL graduates.
4 Results
In this section, we present evidence on the eﬀects of UTL degree on hiring and subsequent
promotion in the ministries. We will argue based on the evidence that UTL graduates may
indeed receive a preferential treatment in the hiring stage, and that this advantage vanishes
in later stages for promotion decisions at higher ranks in the ministerial hierarchy. The later
dissipation of the preferential eﬀects suggests that the apparent initial premium probably
reﬂects the signaling value of elite degree in the presence of diﬃculties in prediction of the
2In 1996, for instance, the government hired 780 fresh recruits in Class I. Of those, administration, law,
and economics ﬁelds accounted for 33, 157, and 95, respectively, totaling 285 or roughly one third of the
total. See Hata (2003), p. 622.Premium for Elite College Education 6
true productivity of a worker, rather than favoritism based on school ties.
4.1 Eﬀects of UTL on hiring
Table 1 presents the total number of fresh recruits and UTL graduates by ministry and by
year.3 Perhaps the most striking feature of the recruiting practices is the high proportion
of UTL graduates hired each year. Except for the year 1973, the share of UTL graduates
among new hires hovers around or above 50 percent. In the powerful Ministry of Finance, the
share is consistently above 50 percent. The pattern is similar in the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry. The Ministry of Home Aﬀairs sets the record with rates almost always
above 70 percent.4
The other remarkable feature in Table 1 is of course the signiﬁcant drop in both the num-
ber of recruits and the proportion of UTL graduates in the year 1973 against the backdrop
of higher-than- usual comparable ﬁgures for the adjacent cohorts. The Figures 1-3 vividly
show the depth of the drop in 1973, for all ministries, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of
Home Aﬀairs, respectively.
Regressions reported in the Appendix quantify the responses of the ministries to the
1969 admission freeze. The outcome variables are the total number of recruits and the
proportion of UTL graduates among them, by ministry and year, respectively. In addition
to the ministry dummies,5 the regression equations include three period dummies for year
1973, the two-year period leading up to the 1973 crunch (1971-2), and lastly the two-year
3The table exhausts all the ministries headed by a cabinet minister, with the exception of the Ministry
of Foreign Aﬀairs. The ministry has its own exam to select professional diplomats. Due to frequent postings
overseas, oﬃcials in the ministry are hard to trace through issues of seikan y¯ oran. For these reasons, we
exclude the ministry from the analysis.
4The shares of graduates from the University of Tokyo as a whole are at a slightly higher level. As
Johnson (1982) explains, the University of Tokyo has always provided the greatest number of applicants who
pass the examinations, because of its original orientation toward education for government service, as well
as general excellence. The other important Faculty relatively well represented in the composition of elite
bureaucrats is the Faculty of Economics. The remaining portion is accounted for by graduates from Kyoto
University, T¯ ohoku University, Hitotsubashi University, and some others. For reference, during 1977 about
53,000 people took the Class I Civil Service Examination, and only about 1,300 passed, a ratio of 1 passer
to 41 applicants. (Johnson (1982))
5The omitted category is the ministry of education.Premium for Elite College Education 7
period in the wake of the crunch (1974-5). The coeﬃcient estimates for the period dummies
suggest that the ministries responded by increasing both the total number of recruits and
the proportion of UTL graduates among them in the periods surrounding the 1973 crunch,
so that they could aﬀo r dt ot a k ei naf e w e rn u m b e ro fr e c r u i t sa n dal o w e rp r o p o r t i o no f
UTL graduates in 1973 itself.
Interpretation of these results hinges on whether the quality of applicants’ pools remained
similar in and around 1973. If it did, the results must mean that UTL graduates receive a
favorable treatment in the hiring stage, while it is unclear whether it reﬂects a favoritism
based on school ties or diﬃculties in measurement of the true productivity and the value of
UTL degree as a signal of productivity.6
4.2 Eﬀects of UTL on promotion afterward
Next we turn to the eﬀect of UTL degree on promotion probabilities. We will marshal
various kinds of evidence, ranging from Kaplan-Meier survival estimates and statistical tests
for equality of survival curves to instrumental variables estimates and duration models, in
support of the view that discrimination based on where one went to college does not exist
in later stages for promotion. As Chalmers Johnson (1982) explains, promotion is virtually
guaranteed for all Class I oﬃcials up to the level of section chief. To reach the rank of section
chief may take about 18 years in the Ministry of Finance and there are slight variations across
ministries. The competition for promotion is made explicit from the rank of section chief.
Gates for promotion get more and more narrow, as one advances to higher ranks.7
Since the promotion system is characterized by ”up or out” competition, as emphasized
by Inatsugu (1996), promotion patterns may be conveniently compared through survival
6It is certainly possible that the quality of the pool in the 1973 recruiting season was lower than in
usual years. Young students’ preferences may be malleable and easily inﬂuenced by the prevailing norms
in the college they attend. If the norms in universities other than UT tend to discourage future careers in
government, then some of those talented students who might have elected to take the government service
exam, had they entered UT in 1969, may have chosen careers in the private sector due to their exposure to
non-UT environments.
7After section chief, the typical path takes the order of chief of General Aﬀairs Section in an external
agency, chief in one of the Secretariat Sections, deputy chief or department head, internal bureau chief,
Director-general of an external bureau, and ﬁnally (administrative) vice-minister, the top position for career
oﬃcials.Premium for Elite College Education 8
curves. Figure 4 presents Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for UTL graduates (broken lines)
and others (solid lines). The diagram clearly shows that survival rates are always higher
for UTL graduates. Indeed, the Peto-Peto test statistic for equality of two survival curves
is χ2(1) = 8.84, with the p-value of 0.003. The results may seem to suggest that UTL
graduates keep receiving a preferential treatment even in advanced stages of their career. It
is not clear, however, whether the results reﬂe c tf a v o r i t i s mo rs u p e r i o rp r o d u c t i v i t yo fU T L
graduates.
Ad i ﬀerent pattern emerges when we compare survival rates of 1973 and the adjacent
entry cohorts. Figure 5 presents Kaplan-Meier survival estimates by entry years. 1972 entry
cohort is represented by a solid line, 1973 cohort by a broken line, and 1974 cohort by a
d o t t e dl i n e . B a s e do nt h eﬁgure, survival patterns do not show any signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between entry cohorts. 8 Between 1973 entry cohort and the remaining cohorts, the Peto-
Peto test statistic for equality of two survival curves is χ2(1) = 0.22, with the p-value of
0.640: we cannot reject the null hypothesis that two survival curves are indistinguishable.
Tables 2-4 present and compare OLS and IV estimates of the eﬀects of UTL degree on
survival probabilities, conditional on survival up to the twentieth year in government service.
The outcome variable in Table 2 is a dummy assuming the value of unity if the individual is
still in the government in the 22nd year. The outcome variables are similar survival dummies
for the 24th year and for the 26th year, respectively.9 In each table, model (1) is a simple
regression of the survival dummy on the UTL dummy; models (2) controls for entry year,
place of birth, and ministry; model (3) controls additionally for entry age. Age at entry into
ministry may serve as a rough proxy for ability: the smarter set may pass the exam while
in college and join the ministry upon graduation, while the less smart may take longer to
make the cut.
OLS estimates for the UTL coeﬃcient are not terribly large, but they do grow with the
time period allowed. For instance, OLS estimates in Table 4 suggest that survival premium
8We get a similar conclusion when we throw in more cohorts, but we present this ﬁgure for better legibility.
9It should be noted that the longevity of the 1973 entry cohort is right censored in the 27th year, since
our data covers only up to year 2000. After 2000, the administrative reform considerably changed the
jurisdictions of ministries and personnel compositions between ministries.Premium for Elite College Education 9
accruing to UTL degree may be in the range of 7 to 9 percent for survival up to 26th
year (conditional on survival up to 20th year). However, these estimates are likely to be
contaminated due to omitted variables bias, and overstate the true impact if promotion (and
thus survival) partly depends on unobserved ability and if unobserved ability is positively
correlated with UTL degree.
IV estimates circumvent this problem by using the 1973 entry dummy as an instrument.
As ﬁrst stage regression results demonstrate in Table 6, the 1973 entry dummy is signiﬁcantly
correlated with UTL degree dummy at diﬀerent time points, even after controlling for a host
of covariates.10 In addition, we argue that the 1973 entry dummy is not correlated with
unobserved ability, if the quality of applicants’ pools is comparable in and around 1973.11
In contrast to the OLS estimates, IV estimates are either negative or indistinguishable from
zero. Provided that our identifying assumption is valid, these results are consistent with the
view that UTL graduates do not enjoy a premium for promotion, once they are hired.
To those who ﬁnd the results surprising, we must point out that our results may reﬂect
the promotion practices in the Japanese government and also the fact that we are examining
the UTL eﬀects after twenty years since individuals joined the government service. The
Japanese government makes a point of promoting all Class I oﬃcials in a parallel manner for
roughly 18 years, up to the level of section chief. Oﬃcials are allowed to experience various
posts in and out of their ministry, and are closely evaluated for their performance. Almost
twenty years of data should be suﬃcient to reveal the true productivity of the individual,
and a degree from UTL or elsewhere may be superﬂuous as a signal for ability.
Finally, Table 7 presents estimation results of duration models. All models are im-
10That the value of coeﬃcient estimates for the 1973 entry dummy remains stable at about 35 percent,
and is close to the initial deﬁcit in the proportion of UTL graduates in the 1973 cohort compared to the
other cohorts is interesting. The fact reﬂects that the proportion of UTL graduates in the 1973 entry cohort
virtually stayed the same throughout the years. This suggests that UTL graduates’ and the others’ survival
rates are about the same.
11Unfortunately, we do not have a rigorous, and easily available, way to test this key identifying assumption.
One possibility might be to examine the ﬂuctuation in the numbers of applicants in and around 1973, and
particularly the numbers of applicants from elite universities. Another possibility might be to conduct
interviews with those were responsible for ministerial hiring back in 1973.Premium for Elite College Education 10
plemented as proportional hazard models with the Weibull distribution.12 The ancillary
parameter p is invariably signiﬁcantly larger than unity regardless of model speciﬁcation,
meaning the baseline hazard increases exponentially over time. The presented numbers for
explanatory variables are hazard ratios, or exponentiated coeﬃcients. If the hazard ratio for
a variable is greater than one, then an increase in the value of the variable expedites exits
(termination of government career in the context of the current paper), or raises the hazard
rates. In contrast, a hazard ratio less than1m e a n st h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt h ev a l u eo ft h e
corresponding variable will decrease the hazard rates.13 Standard errors are given within the
parentheses.
The UTL dummy is shown to clearly decrease the hazard rates in model (1) (without
controls for covariates) and model (3) (with covariates). Similar to OLS estimates, how-
ever, these estimates may be confounding the true eﬀects of UTL degree with the eﬀects of
unobserved individual heterogeneity. Models (2) (without controls) and (4) (with controls)
focus on the eﬀects of the 1973 entry dummy instead. The estimated hazard ratios are less
than one for the 1973 entry dummy. Recall that 1973 is the cohort with a smaller share of
UTL graduates than the others. Therefore the results in (2) and (4) imply that, informally
controlling for unobserved ability, UTL degree has the eﬀects of raising the hazard rates,
even though the impacts are statistically indistinguishable from one.
5 Concluding Remarks
We used in this paper the 1969 admission freeze at the University of Tokyo as a natural
experiment to examine the eﬀects of elite college (University of Tokyo, Faculty of Law)
education on hiring and promotion probabilities for the Japanese government’s elite civil
servants. Simply comparing promotion probabilities between UTL graduates and the others,
as in OLS and comparable methods, runs the risk of committing an omitted variables bias.
In contrast, our approach has the eﬀect of indirectly controlling for unobserved ability or
12Kiefer (1988) is an elegant introduction to duration models.
13Hazard rates are a function of duration t and represent the rate at which spells (government careers)
will be completed at duration t, given that they last until t.Premium for Elite College Education 11
unobserved individual heterogeneity that may be correlated with UTL degree.
The results suggest that while there may or may not be discrimination based on where one
went to school in the initial hiring stage, any such eﬀe c t sh a v ev a n i s h e da sl o n ga sp r o m o t i o n
decisions are concerned at senior levels. The patterns suggest that if UTL graduates did
receive a favorable treatment in the hiring stage, that is probably because of the value of
UTL degree as a signal for productivity, not because of favoritism based on school ties. Since
c r o n y i s mb a s e do ns c h o o lt i e si sl e s sl i k e l yt om a t t e ri nt h ep r i v a t es e c t o re x p o s e dt om a r k e t
discipline, our ﬁnding augurs well for a similar problem in the private sector.
We note the following limitations in our study.
While there may be little discrimination based on survival, there still may be discrimina-
tion in terms of assignment to important and less important posts. We plan to examine this
possibility in a further study. There are well known key posts in each individual ministry
that any vice-minister hopeful is required to have served in. We should be able to check
whether the members of the 1973 entry cohort were shunned in assignment to these coveted
posts.
Our interpretation of the results critically hinges on the validity of the key identifying
assumption: the quality of applicants’ pools was comparable between the 1973 and the other
cohorts. We need to explore ways to test this assumption.
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  UTL  4  9  9  10  8  8  3  5  11 
  %UTL  44.4  100.0  81.8  62.5  88.9  72.7  30.0  41.7  64.7 
Home Affairs  Total  14  17  18  16  14  20  8  17  17 
  UTL  11  11  13  13  14  18  3  14  13 
  %UTL  78.6  64.7  72.2  81.3  100.0  90.0  37.5  82.4  76.5 
Labor  Total  9  13  12  8  11  12  7  8  14 
  UTL  2  1  2  2  3  8  2  3  5 
  %UTL  22.2  7.7  16.7  25.0  27.3  66.7  28.6  37.5  35.7 
Transportation  Total  15  12  17  17  16  17  20  17  17 
  UTL  10  6  12  10  12  11  2  11  9 
  %UTL  66.7  50.0  70.6  58.8  75.0  64.7  10.0  64.7  52.9 
Finance  Total  23  22  21  22  23  24  17  27  27 
  UTL  13  11  15  13  12  13  1  15  17 
  %UTL  56.5  50.0  71.4  59.1  52.2  54.2  5.9  55.6  63.0 
EPA  Total  7  7  8  8  9  6  6  9  7 
  UTL  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0 
  %UTL  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  11.1  0.0  16.7  11.1  0.0 
 Table 1: The Number of New Recruits and UTL Graduates, by Ministry and Year (continued) 
 
Int'l Trade & 
Industryustry  Total  20  19  20  19  19  19  20  20  25 
  UTL  12  9  11  8  13  10  3  11  13 
  %UTL  60.0  47.4  55.0  42.1  68.4  52.6  15.0  55.0  52.0 
Agri.  Total  10  13  10  16  19  20  14  16  16 
Forestry & 
Fisheries  UTL  4  7  7  6  6  7  5  7  12 
  %UTL  40.0  53.8  70.0  37.5  31.6  35.0  35.7  43.8  75.0 
Education  Total  11  14  14  10  11  12  10  12  10 
  UTL  1  2  5  1  6  8  4  2  4 
  %UTL  9.1  14.3  35.7  10.0  54.5  66.7  40.0  16.7  40.0 
  total  131  136  145  146  149  157  126  152  165 
  UTL  64  62  81  71  87  94  28  74  92 










  Table 2. Effects of UTL education on survival: 20-22 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%, 
* significant at 5%, 
** significant at 1%. The instrument is the 
dummy for entry in 1973.  
 
  (1)  (2)   (3) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
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(8.6817)* Table 3. Effects of UTL education on survival: 20-24 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%, 
* significant at 5%, 
** significant at 1% 
The instrument is the dummy for entry in 1973.  
 
  (1)  (2)   (3) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
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(13.3865) ** Table 4. Effects of UTL education on survival: 20-26 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%, 
* significant at 5%, 
** significant at 1% 
The instrument is the dummy for entry in 1973. 
 
  (1)  (2)   (3) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 








0.0693   
(0.0347)* 
-0.0490   
(0.1452) 
Entry age          -0.0422    
(0.0142)* 
-0.0475    
(0.0157)* 








































0.4149   
(0.0879)**
















Health  & 
Welfare 








Int’l  Trade 
and Industry. 




0.0672   
(0.0752) 
0.0779   
(0.0769) 


































constant  0.6233 
(0.0247) ** 









(21.9626)*Table 5. Impacts of UTL education on survival: a sequential look  
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%, 
* significant at 5%, 
** significant at 1%. The models are all 
estimated by 2SLS with the 1973 entry dummy as an instrument.  
 
 
  20-22  22-24   24-26 































































































(20.5998) Table 6. First Stage Regressions  
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
+ significant at 10%, 
* significant at 5%, 
** significant at 1%.  
 
  Dependent variable: UTL  
  Up 20 years  Up 22 years  Up 24 years  






















































Health & Welfare  0.2210 
(0.0809)* 
0.1893        (0.0848)* 0.0803 
(0.0947)* 



































(17.6061) Table 7. Impact on Hazard rates (proportional hazard, Weibull distribution) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
UTL  0.7920 
(0.0631)* 
  0.7847 
(0.0671)* 
 
entry73    0.9470 
(0.1195) 
  0.8323   
(0.1105) 












Kansai      0.8131 
(0.1068) 
0.8131    
(0.1071) 
EPA      0.8169 
(0.1978) 
0.8892     
(0.2138) 
Communications      0.6808 
(0.1510)+ 
0.6574     
0.1457+ 
Agriculture      1.2907 
(0.2572) 
1.2819    
(0.2560) 
Home Affairs      1.6216 
(0.3471)* 
1.4760     
(0.3124)+ 
Health & Welfare      0.9616 
(0.2080) 
0.9284    
(0.2009) 
Int’l  Trade  and 
Industry. 
    1.3912 
(0.2596)+ 
1.3966     
(0.2620)+ 
Finance      0.8607 
(0.1648) 
0.8549     
(0.1644) 




Labor      1.0171 
(0.2376) 
1.0507     
(0.2453) 
Transportation      0.7149 
(0.1458) 
0.7140     
(0.1459)+ 























(0.0050) Figure 1. Total number of recruits and UTL graduates: 1967-1975 
 
















































 Figure 3. Total number of recruits and UTL graduates: Ministry of Home Affairs  
 
Total number of recruits and UTL graduates


































































0 10 20 30
analysis time
tl = 0 tl = 1









































0 10 20 30
analysis time
entryyr = 1972 entryyr = 1973
entryyr = 1974
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by entryyr
   Wednesday May 12 16:36:08 2004   Page 1
                                                     ___  ____  ____  ____  ____tm
                                                    /__    /   ____/   /   ____/  
                                                   ___/   /   /___/   /   /___/   
                                                     Statistics/Data Analysis     
       log:   e:\data\ut\do\utl.smcl
  log type:   smcl
 opened on:   12 May 2004, 16:34:04
1 . infile str20 ministry entryyr total utl using e:\data\ut\datafiles\utl
'entryyr' cannot be read as a number for entryyr[1]
'Total' cannot be read as a number for total[1]
'utl' cannot be read as a number for utl[1]
(91 observations read)
2 . 
3 . gen utlp=utl/total
(1 missing value generated)
4 . label variable utlp "proportion of utl grads"
5 . label variable utl "num of utl grads"
6 . label variable total "num of new recruits by min by yr"
7 . 
8 . gen maff=ministry=="maff"
9 . gen moe=ministry=="moe"
10 . gen mof=ministry=="mof"
11 . gen mot=ministry=="mot"
12 . gen moc=ministry=="moc"
13 . gen epa=ministry=="epa"
14 . gen mol=ministry=="mol"
15 . gen mcom=ministry=="mcom"
16 . gen miti=ministry=="miti"
17 . gen mhw=ministry=="mhw"
18 . 
19 . gen entry73=entryyr==1973
20 . gen e7172=(entryyr>1970 & entryyr<1973)
21 . gen e7475=(entryyr==1974 | entryyr==1975)
22 . save e:\data\ut\datafiles\utl, replace 
file e:\data\ut\datafiles\utl.dta saved
23 . 
24 . reg total entry73 e7172 e7475 maff mof mot epa mol mcom miti mhw
       Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =       90
           F( 11,    78) =    24.56
       Model    1738.47222    11  158.042929           Prob > F      =   0.0000
    Residual    501.983333    78  6.43568376           R-squared     =   0.7759
           Adj R-squared =   0.7443
       Total    2240.45556    89  25.1736579           Root MSE      =   2.5369  Wednesday May 12 16:36:42 2004   Page 2
       total        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
     entry73        -1.35   .8969172    -1.51   0.136    -3.135625     .435625
       e7172         1.35   .6947491     1.94   0.056    -.0331391    2.733139
       e7475          1.9   .6947491     2.73   0.008     .5168609    3.283139
        maff     1.277778   1.035671     1.23   0.221    -.7840843     3.33964
         mof     9.277778   1.035671     8.96   0.000     7.215916    11.33964
         mot     2.833333   1.035671     2.74   0.008     .7714712    4.895195
         epa    -6.166667   1.035671    -5.95   0.000    -8.228529   -4.104805
         mol    -3.166667   1.035671    -3.06   0.003    -5.228529   -1.104805
        mcom     .6111111   1.035671     0.59   0.557    -1.450751    2.672973
        miti          6.5   1.035671     6.28   0.000     4.438138    8.561862
         mhw    -2.055556   1.035671    -1.98   0.051    -4.117418    .0063065
       _cons     13.03889   .6685226    19.50   0.000     11.70796    14.36982
25 . reg utlp entry73 e7172 e7475 maff mof mot epa mol mcom miti mhw
       Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =       90
           F( 11,    78) =     8.83
       Model    3.15071125    11  .286428295           Prob > F      =   0.0000
    Residual    2.53079554    78  .032446097           R-squared     =   0.5546
           Adj R-squared =   0.4917
       Total    5.68150678    89  .063837155           Root MSE      =   .18013
        utlp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
     entry73     -.211122   .0636849    -3.32   0.001    -.3379089   -.0843352
       e7172     .1144586   .0493301     2.32   0.023     .0162499    .2126672
       e7475     .0195475   .0493301     0.40   0.693    -.0786612    .1177561
        maff    -.0695911   .0735369    -0.95   0.347    -.2159919    .0768097
         mof    -.0191541   .0735369    -0.26   0.795    -.1655549    .1272467
         mot     .0315667   .0735369     0.43   0.669    -.1148341    .1779675
         epa    -.4957028   .0735369    -6.74   0.000    -.6421036    -.349302
         mol    -.2419056   .0735369    -3.29   0.002    -.3883065   -.0955048
        mcom    -.0122185   .0735369    -0.17   0.868    -.1586193    .1341823
        miti    -.0416612   .0735369    -0.57   0.573     -.188062    .1047396
         mhw     .1130333   .0735369     1.54   0.128    -.0333675    .2594341
       _cons     .5325915   .0474679    11.22   0.000     .4380902    .6270929
26 . 
27 . log close
        log:   e:\data\ut\do\utl.smcl
  log type:   smcl
 closed on:   12 May 2004, 16:34:04